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In Texas, as in most of the United States, the sale of liquor is heavily regulated.
Moreover, regulations vary across diﬀerent localities within the state. Some
are “dry”, completing prohibiting the retail sale of alcoholic beverages. Others
permit the sale of only certain types of liquor or require that liquor be consumed
“oﬀ premise”. What is particularly interesting about Texas is that alcohol
regulations at the local level are determined directly by the citizens.1 A citizen
wishing to change regulations in his community can get the change voted on in a
referendum. Such referenda are commonplace, with over 500 elections between
1976 and 1996.
These liquor referenda appear a promising vehicle for understanding voter
turnout. First, turnout varies widely. In some communities over 75% of the
voting age population show up to vote, while in others turnout is less than 10%.
Second, since there is a limited set of regulations that are actually proposed,
the issues decided by the referenda are basically the same across jurisdictions.
Third, the referenda are typically held separately from other elections, so that
the only reason to go to the polls is to vote on the proposed change in liquor
law.
This paper uses data from these referenda to explore a new approach to
understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of Harsanyi (1980)
and Feddersen and Sandroni (2001). It presents a model based on this approach
and structurally estimates it using the referendum data. It then compares the
performance of the model with two alternative models of turnout. The results
are encouraging: the structural estimation yields sensible parameter estimates
and the model performs better than the two alternatives considered.
The approach begins with the observation that a referendum creates a con-
test between two groups: those who support it and those who oppose it. The
winner of the contest is the group the most of whose members vote. Individual
group members are presumed to want to “do their part” to help their side win.
This is not because they receive a transfer from other group members for doing
so - they simply adhere to the belief that this is how a citizen should behave in
a democracy. “Doing their part” is understood to mean showing up to vote if
their costs of going to the polls are below some “reasonable level”.
Explaining turnout amounts to understanding what determines these “rea-
sonable levels”. Here, in the spirit of Harsanyi (1980) and Feddersen and San-
droni (2001), individuals are assumed to determine their “reasonable levels” by
asking themselves the following question: What would be the level of voting
costs below which those on my side of the issue should vote that would max-
imize the payoﬀ of a representative member of my group? Thus, individuals
behave according to the rule that would be best for the group as a whole. Rais-
1Local jurisdictions do not have complete discretion over liquor regulation. For example,
the State of Texas prohibits the sale of alcoholic beverages in certain residential areas and
within 300 feet of a church, school or hospital. There are also statewide restrictions on the
times alcohol may be sold.
2ing the reasonable level creates more turnout and hence raises the probability
of the group’s preferred outcome. On the other hand, it increases the expected
voting costs incurred by group members. Balancing these two considerations
determines the reasonable level.
The reasonable level so determined will depend on the turnout expected
from the opposing group. The greater the number of votes from the opposition,
the higher the reasonable level must be in order to ensure any given chance of
success. The reasonable level for individuals in one group will therefore depend
on that expected to be chosen by individuals in the opposition. Accordingly,
it is natural to think of the reasonable levels as being determined in a game in
which individuals from the two groups simultaneously choose their levels. In
equilibrium, individuals in each group must be satisﬁed with their reasonable
level, given the level they expect the opposing group to choose.
The equilibrium reasonable levels depend on election speciﬁc characteristics
like the relative sizes of the two competing groups, the importance of the issue
decided by the referendum to the groups, and expected voting costs. Under-
standing these relationships yields predictions for how turnout should depend
on election speciﬁc characteristics. In this way, the approach yields a theory of
turnout.
The speciﬁc model developed in the paper assumes that all supporters enjoy
t h es a m eb e n e ﬁt and all opposers incur the same cost if the referendum passes.
This sidesteps the interesting question of how the burden of voting should be
shared among group members with diﬀering intensities of preference. In ad-
dition, the fraction of supporters is assumed to be the realization of a random
variable with a Beta distribution. Individuals do not observe the realization but
do know the parameters of the Beta distribution. This captures the idea that
individuals will be aware of general characteristics of their fellow citizens - such
as age and religious aﬃliation - that will inﬂuence the likely distribution of sup-
porters. Finally, the cost of voting for each supporter and opposer is assumed
to be the realization of an independent random variable uniformly distributed
on an identical support. The model is therefore described by ﬁve parameters:
the beneﬁt of the proposed change to supporters; the cost to opposers; the two
parameters of the Beta distribution; and the upper bound of the support of vot-
ing costs. The equilibrium reasonable levels for supporters and opposers depend
on these parameters and these, together with the realization of the fraction of
supporters, determine the turnout of supporters and opposers.
Our data include information on the type of referendum, the votes for and
against, and when the referendum was voted on. We also know the size of the
voting population and many characteristics of the jurisdiction in question at
the time of the election. This includes the religious aﬃliations of the county
population and the liquor regulations in neighboring communities. Finally, we
know weather conditions on the day of voting. We specify functional forms which
relate our parameters to these characteristics and then estimate the coeﬃcients.
In this procedure, we draw on the work of Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999).
The two alternative models we consider maintain the same underlying as-
sumptions concerning the environment but postulate diﬀerent voting behavior.
3They are ad hoc, in the sense that they do not provide an account of why peo-
ple behave in the postulated way. Nonetheless, they do capture ideas that have
been expressed in the literature. The intensity hypothesis says that people are
more likely to vote the more intensely they feel about an issue. The popularity
hypothesis says that individuals are more likely to vote if they believe that many
of their fellow citizens share their position on the issue. Using the non-nested
hypothesis test of Vuong (1989), we reject the hypotheses that these alternative
models and our basic model are equally close to the true data generating process
in favor of the alternative hypothesis that our basic model is closer.
The organization of the remainder of the paper is as follows. The next sec-
tion explains how the paper relates to previous work on voter turnout. Section
3 describes the institutional details concerning the referenda that we study and
presents the raw data. Section 4 presents the model. Section 5 describes how
we estimate it and section 6 discusses the results. Section 7 outlines the two al-
ternative models and compares their performance with the basic model. Section
8 concludes with suggestions for further research.
2 Relationship to the turnout literature
Understanding voter turnout is a central problem in political economy. Turnout
is sensitive to the speciﬁc characteristics of elections. Political parties under-
stand this and policy stances are fashioned to “bring out the base” or discourage
the opposition’s base. Accordingly, turnout not only determines which option
wins but also shapes the policy options from which voters select. Reﬂecting this
importance, there has been a considerable amount of work on the subject. Here,
we brieﬂy point out where our paper ﬁts into the literature. The reader is re-
ferred to Aldrich (1993), (1997), Fiorina (1997), Grossman and Helpman (2001),
and Matsusaka and Palda (1993), (1999) for broader overviews and discussion.
The well-known calculus of voting model of turnout (Downs (1957), Riker
and Ordeshook (1968)) deﬁnes the beneﬁts of voting as pB + d where p is the
probability of swinging the election, B is the gain from having one’s preferred
candidate win, and d is the beneﬁt a citizen feels from doing his civic duty or
expressing his preference. A voter votes if these beneﬁts exceed the direct cost
of voting, denoted c, which includes the time taken to get to the polls and so
on. To get a useful theory of turnout, it is necessary to understand how these
variables depend on election speciﬁc characteristics.
Since the beneﬁts from doing one’s duty seem rather nebulous, it is tempting
to look at the pB term to understand turnout. The pivotal-voter model of
Ledyard (1984) and Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) provides a natural way of
endogenizing the probability that a voter will swing the election. However,
the obvious problem with this approach would seem to be that p is suﬃciently
small in any large election that changes in pB are likely to be minuscule across
elections. Thus, many have questioned the fruitfulness of a theory of turnout
based on minuscule changes in a minuscule number (see, for example, Green
and Shapiro (1994)). Formal support for this concern is provided by Palfrey
4a n dR o s e n t h a l ’ sw e l lk n o w nr e s u l tt h a ti nas u ﬃciently large electorate the only
citizens who vote in equilibrium are those for whom d is no smaller than c.2
Accordingly, signiﬁcant variations in turnout in large elections must arise from
variations in the fraction of the population for whom d is no smaller than c.
More recently, researchers have turned to the d term. An interesting line of
work has assumed that this term can be inﬂuenced by leaders (see, for example,
Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999)). The idea is that in close elections or in elections
where there is much at stake, community and political leaders put in more
eﬀort exhorting their fellows to vote and this leads to higher turnout. The
eﬀort decisions of political leaders are rational because their eﬀorts can sway
large groups of voters. Exactly why such exhortions are successful is not clear,
which seems a diﬃculty with the approach.3
An alternative strategy is to think more deeply about where individuals’
notions of duty in the voting context may come from. Harsanyi (1980) argues
that voting may usefully be understood as individuals acting according to the
dictates of rule-utilitarianism. A rule-utilitarian takes the action that, if taken
by all rule-utilitarians, would maximize aggregate utility.4 Harsanyi illustrates
his argument by considering an environment in which a ﬁxed number of votes
are needed to pass a policy that would raise aggregate utility. Each citizen faces
the same cost of voting and chooses a probability of voting that, if adopted
by all, would maximize aggregate utility. The key insight is that the optimal
probability is between zero and one. Not everybody should stay home, because
that would mean the policy would not pass. But not everybody should vote
because that would result in a surfeit of votes, imposing unnecessary costs on
society. In this way, the logic of rule utilitarianism yields an elegant theory
of turnout. In terms of the calculus of voting model, Harsanyi is eﬀectively
assuming that d is large enough so that everyone does their duty but rejects the
implicit assumption that doing one’s duty always involves voting.
Harsanyi’s insight is developed much further by Feddersen and Sandroni
(2001). They consider the more relevant environment of a two candidate plu-
rality rule election in which citizens have heterogeneous voting costs. Feddersen
and Sandroni ﬁrst point out a problem with Harsanyi’s argument in this con-
text. With two candidates to choose from, a rule utilitarian has to choose not
only whether to vote but also for whom to vote. All rule utilitarians would
vote for the candidate that maximizes aggregate utility and, accordingly, if only
rule utilitarians voted, the optimal voting rule would be such that turnout is
minimal. Since all voters would be voting for the same candidate, it is best for
society as a whole to minimize the number of individuals incurring voting costs.
To deal with this problem, Feddersen and Sandroni introduce disagreement
2Palfrey and Rosenthal’s result is for symmetric equilibria in a model where voters are
imperfectly informed about each others’ voting costs and preferences.
3In one of the ﬁrst papers stressing the importance of group leaders, Uhlaner (1989) as-
sumed that leaders oﬀered transfers to group members in exchange for their votes. However,
even when transfers are interpreted most broadly, this practice does not seem particularly
widespread.
4This is distinct from an act-utilitarian who, in any given situation, takes the action that
maximizes aggregate utility.
5on which candidate maximizes aggregate utility. There are two groups of rule
utilitarians with opposing views. Individuals in each group follow a voting rule
that, if followed by all in their group, would maximize aggregate utility given
the behavior of individuals in the opposing group. Feddersen and Sandroni show
that the groups’ voting rules prescribe individuals to vote if and only if their
voting costs are below some critical level. The two groups’ critical cost levels
can be derived from a game in which each group member chooses a critical level
to maximize the utility of a representative member of his group.
W h i l et h e r ea r ed i ﬀerences in the details, Feddersen and Sandroni’s game has
t h es a m eb a s i cs t r u c t u r ea st h eo n es t u d i e di nt h i sp a p e r . 5 The key diﬀerence
between the two approaches is thus one of interpretation. In the approach
studied here, two candidate elections divide the population into two groups
(the supporters of each candidate) and all individuals follow the voting rule
that maximizes the payoﬀ of a representative member of their group. They are
therefore motivated only to help those on their side of the issue. In Feddersen
and Sandroni’s model, all individuals who vote follow the voting rule that they
believe maximizes aggregate utility. The merit of Feddersen and Sandroni’s
approach is that all behavior follows from the single postulate that citizens are
rule utilitarians. This has signiﬁcant theoretical appeal. However, in our view,
it does not seem particularly plausible to suppose that voters only care about
the aggregate beneﬁts associated with diﬀerent candidates and that all turnout
is driven by diﬀerences in beliefs. Moreover, it is not clear why citizens should
have diﬀerent beliefs, nor what should determine the relative sizes of the two
groups.
The approach developed here is also related to the work of Morton (1987),
(1990). She studies a two candidate election and assumes that the population is
exogenously divided into groups with diﬀerent policy preferences. Each group
collectively and simultaneously decides how many of its members should vote
in order to maximize the group’s aggregate beneﬁt . T h ec h o i c et r a d e so ﬀ the
policy beneﬁt associated with changing the outcome of the election with the cost
to members of voting. In Coasian fashion, Morton is not speciﬁco nw h yt h e
groups behave in this way: “The model assumes that groups invest resources
(ﬁnancial or otherwise) which provide group members with the individualized
incentives necessary to vote. These resources are then transformed into votes
by the groups.” (Morton (1987) page 120). This paper’s approach may be
considered as a special case of Morton’s in which there are only two groups -
supporters and opposers. While we prefer our interpretation, there is nothing in
5There are four main diﬀerences in the details. First, in Feddersen and Sandroni’s model,
the payoﬀ of each group member depends on the expected voting costs of the average citizen
in the community as a whole as opposed to the average citizen in his group. This is because
group members care about aggregate utility. Second, in the model of this paper, the two
groups may diﬀer in the intensity of their preference for their preferred candidates. Third, in
Feddersen and Sandroni’s model, the fraction of each group who behave “ethically” (i.e., as
rule utilitarians) is random. Non-ethical voters abstain. Fourth, in Feddersen and Sandroni’s
model, ethical voters will only follow the optimal rule if their payoﬀ from ethical behavior (the
d term) exceeds their voting cost. As in Harsanyi (1980), the model of this paper implicitly
assumes that d is suﬃciently large that individuals always do their part.
6the empirical work to distinguish it from a story where supporters and opposers
collectively determine which of their members should vote.6
While there is a large empirical literature on turnout, there are very few pa-
pers that try to structurally estimate models of turnout. Hansen, Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1987) use data on school budget referenda to try to structurally esti-
mate the pivotal-voter model. Given its complexity, they must make strong as-
sumptions to undertake the estimation. In particular, they assume that the pop-
ulation is equally divided between supporters and opposers and that supporters
and opposers have identical beneﬁts from their preferred outcomes. They then
estimate the parameters of the distribution of voting costs. Our simpler model
permits estimation of the distribution of supporters and opposers, the beneﬁts
of supporters and opposers, and the distribution of voting costs.
Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999) use state-by-state voting in U.S. presidential
elections to structurally estimate a model based on the “follow the leader” ap-
proach. Their model assumes that Democratic and Republican leaders in each
state expend eﬀort to impact the outcome of the presidential election.7 Lead-
ers’ ability to have an impact depends on how followers respond and on the
expected closeness of the race (at both state and national levels). The former
is a parameter of the model to be estimated and the latter depends on the dis-
tribution of Democrats and Republicans in the population, which is estimated
from past election outcomes. The authors conclude that voters do respond to
eﬀort and that eﬀort is higher in races that are predicted to be closer. Shachar
and Nalebuﬀ’s model is an equilibrium model in that the leaders from the two
p a r t i e si ne a c hs t a t ec h o o s et h e i re ﬀort levels simultaneously. This gives it a
similar ﬂavor to our model.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Institutional background
Chapter 251 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code states that “On proper
petition by the required number of voters of a county, or of a justice precinct or
incorporated city or town in the county, the Commissioners’ Court shall order
a local election in the political subdivision to determine whether or not the sale
of alcoholic beverages of one or more of the various types and alcoholic contents
shall be prohibited or legalized in the county, justice precinct, or incorporated
city or town”. Thus, citizens can propose changes in the liquor laws of their
communities and have their proposals directly voted on in referenda. Such
6Morton (1987) endogenizes the policy choices oﬃce-seeking candidates would make given
this group voting behavior. Building on this work, Filer, Kenny and Morton (1993) present
a group voting model where candidates propose tax schemes that diﬀer in the degree of
progressiveness. The paper empirically tests the model’s qualitiative predictions using county-
level turnouts in the 1948, 1960, 1968 and 1980 presidential elections.
7One drawback with the study is that, in reality, voters are voting on many other issues
at the same time as they are casting their presidential ballot.
7direct democracy has a long history in Texas liquor regulation, with local liquor
elections dating back to the mid 1800s.8
The process by which citizens may propose a change for their jurisdiction is
relatively straightforward. The ﬁrst step involves applying to the Registrar of
Voters for a petition. This only requires the signatures of ten or more registered
voters in the jurisdiction. The hard work comes after receipt of the petition.
The applicants must get it signed by at least 35% of the registered voters in the
jurisdiction and must do this within thirty days.9 If this hurdle is successfully
completed, the Commissioners’ Court of the county to which the jurisdiction
belongs must order a referendum be held. This order must be issued at its
ﬁrst regular session following the completion of the petition and the referendum
must be held between twenty and thirty days from the time of the order. All
registered voters can vote and if the proposed change receives at least as many
aﬃrmative as negative votes, it is approved.
Citizens may propose changes for their entire county, their justice precinct, or
the city or town in which they reside. The state is divided into 254 counties and
each county is divided into justice precincts.10 Accordingly, a justice precinct
lies within the county to which it belongs. By contrast, a city may spillover
into two or more justice precincts. If only part of a city belongs to a particular
justice precinct that has approved a change, then that part must abide by the
new regulations. However, if the city then subsequently approved a diﬀerent
set of regulations, then they would also be binding on the part contained in the
justice precinct in question. Eﬀectively, current regulations are determined by
the referendum most recently approved. Over our data period, citizens almost
always choose to propose changes at the city or justice precinct level rather than
at the county level.
Importantly for the purposes of our study, liquor referenda are typically
held separate from other elections. Section 41.01 of the Texas Election Laws sets
aside four dates each year as uniform election dates.11 These are the dates when
presidential, gubernatorial, and congressional elections are held. In addition,
other issues are often decided on these days such as the election of aldermen, and
the approval of the sale of public land and bond issuances. Elections pertaining
to these other issues may occur, but rarely do, on dates other than uniform
election days. Liquor referenda, in contrast, do not typically occur on uniform
election dates. This reﬂects the tight restrictions placed by Chapter 251 on the
timing of elections.12
8From 1919 to 1935, these elections were abolished as a result of prohibition. Since 1935,
the process of citizen-democracy has been governed by the procedures described in Chapter
251 of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Code.
9Prior to 1993, the number of signatures needed was 35% of the total number of votes cast
in the last preceding gubernatorial election.
10The number of justice precincts in a county range from 1 to 8.
11These are the third Saturday in January, the ﬁrst Saturday in May, the second Saturday
in August and the ﬁrst Tuesday after the ﬁrst Monday in November.
12Interestingly, the Texas state government voted in 2001 to require liquor law referendum
votes to occur on one of the four uniform election dates. This was to avoid the costs of holding
referenda separately.
83.2 Data
We assembled data on 363 local liquor elections in Texas between 1976 and 1996
where prior to the election the voting jurisdictions prohibited the retail sale of all
alcohol.13 Information on these elections was obtained from the annual reports
of the Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission (TABC). These reports contain
the county, justice precinct, city or town voting on the referendum, the date
of the election, the proposed change, and the number of votes cast for and
against. As indicated in Table 1, the elections diﬀered in the degree to which
restrictions were relaxed: 147 proposed permitting the selling of beer only or
beer and wine; 144 proposed permitting the sale of all alcoholic beverages for
oﬀ-premise consumption only (i.e., liquor stores); and 72 proposed not only that
all beverages be sold but they may be consumed oﬀ- and on-premise (i.e., bars
as well as liquor stores). Of these 363 elections, 2 were at the county level,
133 were at the justice precinct level and 228 were at the city or town level.
While not indicated in Table 1, at least one election occurred in 125 diﬀerent
counties. While certain counties had multiple local liquor elections during this 20
year period, approximately two-thirds of the 363 elections involved jurisdictions
which account for a single election. For those jurisdictions that had multiple
elections, these elections often occur a number of years apart.
We supplemented our election data with information on county-, city- and
town-level populations, by age, obtained from the United States Census. Using
this information, we estimate the voting age population and the population over
the age of 50 at the time of an election. Table 1 indicates that the mean voting
age population in the 363 jurisdictions is 4,415 at the time of the elections.
We also attempted to ﬁnd information that might tell us about the attitudes
of citizens towards the selling of alcohol. Using the county-level population and
county-level information on the number of adherents to Baptist denominations
from Churches & Church Membership in the United States, we constructed es-
timates of the fraction of the county population that is Baptist at the time
of an election. We use this fraction as a proxy for the fraction of Baptists in
each of the 363 jurisdictions; thereby, implicitly assuming that Baptists are uni-
formly distributed throughout each county. As indicated in Table 1, the average
fraction of the county population that is Baptist is 0.48.
Information about what type of alcohol could be sold and where it could be
consumed elsewhere in the county was obtained from the annual reports of the
TABC. The alcohol policy being voted on in a third of the elections is more
liberal than the alcohol policy in the rest of the county. Monthly information on
the number of alcohol related road accidents in each county was obtained from
the Texas Department of Public Safety. The average number of alcohol related
accidents per capita in a county for the twelve months prior to an election is
0.00204. Finally, whether the jurisdiction is located in a Metropolitan Statistical
Area (MSA) was determined using classiﬁcations obtained from the 1996 United
States Census. Table 1 shows that 44% of the elections involved jurisdictions
13See the data appendix for a description of this data collection process. The appendix also
contains a detailed explanation of how certain variables are created.
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In an attempt to get information about the costs of voting, daily weather
conditions at 44 weather stations in Texas was obtained from the United States
Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC). The weather conditions
on the day of each election are taken to be the same as those measured at a
weather station in close proximity to the voting jurisdiction. While many of
these elections occurred on rainy days, as expected, few occurred on days when
snow fell (see Table 1). Besides the weather, whether the election occurred
on a weekend and whether the election occurred in the summer are also likely
to aﬀect the costs of voting. The majority of the 363 elections occurred on a
weekend while slightly more than a quarter occurred in June, July or August.
3.3 Some basic facts
Of our 363 referenda, 150 were approved and 213 were rejected by the voters.
The percent of the voting population that voted for the referendum averaged
17% across the 363 elections while the percent voting against averaged 19%.
The average turnout in these elections (calculated by dividing total votes by
voting age population) is 0.36 but there is substantial variation across elections.
Figure 1 presents the turnout information in a histogram where the vertical axis
measures the number of elections in each turnout category. While a number of
elections had turnout rates over 0.75, the majority had less than a third of the
voting age population vote. Interestingly, average turnout is signiﬁcantly higher
in city-level elections (0.44 compared to 0.21). In addition, average turnout was
signiﬁcantly higher when the referendum involved oﬀ-premise consumption of
all alcohol as opposed to just beer and wine or oﬀ- and on-premise consumption.
The elections tended to be close. When closeness is deﬁned as the diﬀerence
between votes for and against divided by total votes, the average closeness is
0.25. The histogram of this measure is depicted in Figure 2 and demonstrates
that while the majority of the elections are relatively close, there are outliers.
Unlike turnout, the average value of this measure of closeness does not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly between city-level elections and justice precinct- or county-level
elections. It is also similar across the diﬀerent types of regulatory changes.
It is natural to ask whether the data support the familiar idea that turnout
is higher in close elections. This all depends on how we measure closeness.
Proceeding as in Figure 2, there is a slight positive relationship (correlation co-
eﬃcient of 0.12). This positive relationship is stronger if closeness is deﬁned as
the diﬀerence between votes for and against divided by the voting age population
(correlation coeﬃcient of 0.58). However, there is a negative relationship be-
tween turnout and closeness when closeness is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between
votes for and against (correlation coeﬃcient of -0.11).
104 The Model
Consider a community that is holding a referendum on relaxing liquor laws. For
analytical tractability, we adopt the ﬁction that the community has a continuum
of citizens. These citizens are divided into supporters and opposers. Each
supporter is willing to pay b for the relaxation, while each opposer is willing to
pay x to avoid it.
Each citizen knows whether he is a supporter or an opposer, but not the frac-
tion of citizens in each category. However, all citizens know that the fraction of
supporters in the population, denoted µ, is the realization of a random variable
with range [0,1] distributed according to the Beta Distribution.14 Thus, the
probability density function of the random variable is
h(µ;ν,ω)=µν−1(1 − µ)ω−1/B(ν,ω)






The expected fraction of supporters under this distributional assumption is
ν/(ν + ω) and the variance is νω/[(ν + ω)2(ν + ω +1 ) ] . We will assume that
both ν and ω exceed 1 which implies that the density is hump shaped.
Citizens must decide whether or not to vote in the referendum. If they do,
supporters vote in favor and opposers vote against. Voting is costly, with each
citizen i facing a cost of voting ci where ci is the realization of a random variable
uniformly distributed on [0,c]. Citizens know c but do not observe the voting
costs of their fellows. We assume that individuals want to “do their part” to
help their side win, where doing one’s part means showing up to vote if one’s
costs of voting are below some “reasonable level”. Individuals determine these
reasonable levels by asking themselves “what would be the critical level of voting
costs below which those on my side of the issue should vote that would maximize
the payoﬀ of a representative member of my group?”.
Letting the critical voting costs for the two groups be denoted by γs and
γo, if citizen i is a supporter he votes if ci ≤ γs and if he is an opposer he
votes if ci ≤ γo. The probability that a supporter votes is the probability that
γs exceeds ci,w h i c hi sγs/c. Similarly, the probability that an opposer votes is
γo/c. Thus, the referendum passes when µγs/c > (1 − µ)γo/c or, equivalently,






14Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999) model uncertainty in the fraction of the population who are
Democrats in a similar way. However, they assume that the fraction of Democrats is the
realization of a random variable with a normal distribution. This has the obvious drawback
that it can take on values outside the interval [0,1].
11Prior to the realization of his voting cost, a supporter’s expected payoﬀ from







The ﬁrst term represents the expected policy beneﬁts stemming from the refer-
endum passing and the second term represent expected voting costs, given that
a supporter will vote only if ci ≤ γs.15 Similarly, an opposer’s expected payoﬀ






Accordingly, we deﬁne a pair of critical levels (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) to be an equilibrium if
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We say that (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) is an interior equilibrium if both γ∗
s and γ∗
o are between 0
and c.
We are now able to establish the following result.16
Proposition 1 If (γ∗
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This proposition shows that, if there exists an interior equilibrium, it is unique
and, moreover, the equilibrium reasonable levels are related to the parameters
in a relatively simple way. As intuition would suggest, both reasonable levels are
increasing in the maximal voting cost c,a l t h o u g hγ∗
s/c and γ∗
o/c are decreasing
in c. The reasonable level for each group is increasing in the gains or losses to
that group caused by the referendum passing.17













16The proofs of this and the next proposition are in the Appendix.
17If the model were interpreted in the same way as in Feddersen and Sandroni (2001), µ
would be the fraction of the population who believed that the change would be good for society,
b would be their estimate of the average net beneﬁto ft h ec h a n g e ,a n dx would be the estimate
of the average net cost of the change of those who thought it was a bad idea. The objective
12While providing a nice characterization of the equilibrium, the proposition
leaves open the question of existence. There is no general guarantee that an
equilibrium will exist - the payoﬀ functions of supporters and opposers are not
quasi-concave functions of their own reasonable cost levels. Indeed, it is not
diﬃcult to ﬁnd parameter values for which no equilibrium exists.18 In such
circumstances, one of the critical levels described in the proposition is not a
best response for the group in question. This is typically because it would be
better for that group not to vote at all than to vote for cost levels below the
reasonable level identiﬁed in the proposition. This arises, for example, when
one group (say, supporters) is expected to be much smaller than the other (i.e.,
ν/(ν + ω) is small). While the cost level in the proposition is always positive
and implies a positive level of turnout, if supporters are very unlikely to win
they may be better oﬀ just giving up and staying home. But then if supporters
are staying home, the optimal reasonable cost for opposers becomes very small,
which then provides supporters an incentive to vote.
When can we be sure that a pair of critical cost levels satisfying the condi-
tions of Proposition 1 is actually an equilibrium? Our next proposition provides
some useful suﬃcient conditions.
Proposition 2 Suppose that (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) ∈ (0,c]2 satisﬁes (i) the conditions of
Proposition 1, (ii) the “second order” conditions
(ν +2 ) γ∗
s > (ω − 2)γ∗
o &( ω +2 ) γ∗
o > (ν − 2)γ∗
s,










o) is an equilibrium.
The second order conditions in (ii), together with the conditions of Proposition
1, imply that the payoﬀ functions of supporters and opposers are locally strictly
concave at (γ∗
s,γ∗
o). The better than staying home conditions in (iii) ensure that
at (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) the payoﬀs of supporters and opposers are at least as high as if they
simply choose not to vote. The proof of the proposition amounts to showing
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would be deﬁned in the same way and conditions analagous (but diﬀerent) to those presented
in Proposition 1 can be obtained. Since the two interpretations have diﬀerent implications
for the equilibrium reasonable costs, it is in priniciple possible to ask which best ﬁts the data.
However, empirically, it is not clear what the parameters ν and ω should depend on in the
Feddersen and Sandroni interpretation.
18Feddersen and Sandroni (2001) deal with this existence problem in their model by as-
suming that the fraction of individuals in each group who behave “ethically” (i.e., according
to the the dictates of rule utilitarianism) is uncertain. Under the assumption that the two
groups care equally intensely about the election, Feddersen and Sandroni show that equilib-
rium exists and is unique if the fraction of “ethicals” in each group is uncertain, independent,
and uniformly distributed.
13that the payoﬀ functions can have at most one interior local maximum in which
case these three conditions are suﬃcient to imply that γ∗
s is a best response to
γ∗
o and vice versa.
In our empirical work, we estimate the determinants of the exogenous vari-
ables (b,x,c,ν,ω) assuming that supporters and opposers use the reasonable
levels described in Proposition 1. Of course, this is only legitimate if these are
indeed equilibrium reasonable levels. We can check this using Proposition 2.
Our estimates imply values of the exogenous variables (b,x,c,ν,ω) for each ju-
risdiction which, in turn, imply values of the reasonable costs (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) via the
equations of Proposition 1. If these implied values satisfy the second order con-
ditions and the better than staying home conditions of Proposition 2, then we
know that (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) really are equilibrium reasonable costs given (b,x,c,ν,ω).
5 Estimation
We assume that for each jurisdiction j, νj =1+e x p ( βv · zvj) and ωj =1+
exp(βω) where βν is a vector of parameters to be estimated, zvj is a vector
of jurisdiction speciﬁc characteristics that may inﬂuence the mix of supporters
and opposers, and βω is a parameter to be estimated. We further assume
that xj =e x p ( βx · zxj + εj) and bj =e x p ( βb · zbj + εj) where βx and βb are
vectors of parameters to be estimated, zxj and zbj are vectors of jurisdiction
and referendum speciﬁc characteristics that may aﬀect supporters’ beneﬁts and
opposers’ costs and εj is the realization of some random variable distributed
according to the standard normal distribution. The assumption that εj is a
common shock to both supporters’ beneﬁts and opposers’ costs allows us to
derive the likelihood function. Finally, we assume that cj =e x p ( βc · zcj) where
βc is a vector of parameters to be estimated and zcj is a vector of jurisdiction
and referendum speciﬁc variables that may impact voting costs. The functional
forms are selected to ensure that the Beta distribution parameters νj and ωj
are greater than one and that xj,b j,a n dcj are non-negative.
Our task is to estimate the parameters Ω = { βν, βω, βx, βb, βc}.T o
construct the likelihood function, ﬁx Ω and consider a particular jurisdiction j.
Suppose that the fraction of the population voting in favor of the referendum
is vsj and against is voj. Then, according to the model, vsj = µjγ∗
sj/cj and
voj =( 1− µj)γ∗
oj/cj where µj is the fraction of the voting population who
are supporters and γ∗
sj and γ∗
oj are the equilibrium reasonable cost levels for
supporters and opposers.























































We can now solve these two equations for the realizations of µj and εj implied











εj =2l n ( voj
q
b bj + vsj
p
b xj) − 2ln(Kj
p
b xj).
These equations deﬁne µj and εj as functions of the turnouts (vsj,v oj).U s -
ing the distributions of µj and εj, we can now compute the probability of ob-
serving any pair of turnouts (see the Appendix for the derivation). Letting
Zj =( zxj,z bj,z vj,z cj), the probability density function for (vsj,v oj) is
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b xj − (ωj +2 )l n
q
b bj.




g(vsj,v oj | Ω,Z j). (1)
Any given estimate of the parameters Ω = { βν, βω, βx, βb, βc} implies
values of the exogenous variables for each jurisdiction j.19 These, in turn, imply
19Thus, νj = 1 + exp(βv · zvj), ωj =1+e x p ( βω),a n dcj =e x p ( βc · zcj). Moreover, xj =







15values of the reasonable costs via the equations of Proposition 1. Unconstrained
maximization of the likelihood function generates parameter estimates which,
for some jurisdictions, imply values of the reasonable costs that exceed the
maximum possible cost. Since this is clearly inconsistent with the model, we
must maximize the likelihood function subject to the feasibility constraints that
γ∗
sj ≤ cj and γ∗
oj ≤ cj for each jurisdiction j.20



















































We can now solve for the parameters that maximize the likelihood function
subject to these constraints.21 As noted in the previous section, we may then use
Proposition 2 to check whether the estimated reasonable cost levels are actually
an equilibrium given the values of the exogenous variables. Remarkably, this is
the case for every jurisdiction.
6R e s u l t s
The empirical results of the basic model are shown in Tables 2 and 3. Table
2 presents the parameter estimates that maximize the likelihood function in
Equation (1) subject to the constraints speciﬁed in Equation (2). Using these
20By imposing these feasibility constraints, we are requiring that the choice of parameters
must satisfy the conditions of Proposition 1 when either γ∗
sj and γ∗
oj equals cj. This restricts
the choice of parameters in a marginally tighter way than is implied by the model. This is
because the conditions of Proposition 1 need not be satisﬁed if either group’s reasonable cost
level is at the boundary. In the boundary case, the ﬁrst order conditions are in the form of
weak inequalities rather than equalities. Since this dampens the ability of the model to ﬁt
the data, it will in no way compromise our conclusions about the relative performance of the
model.
21The Appendix contains a detailed description of how we solved the constrained maximiza-
tion problem.
16parameter estimates, Table 3 presents some aggregate information about the
implied values of the model’s exogenous variables for the 363 jurisdictions.
We expect the fraction of supporters in a jurisdiction to be a function of
the fraction of baptists, the fraction of citizens over the age of 50, the number
of alcohol related accidents in the prior year, and the jurisdiction’s perception
of the eﬀects of a less restrictive alcohol policy. This perception is likely to
depend on whether the jurisdiction is a city (compared to a justice precinct or
county) and whether the jurisdiction is located in an MSA. Therefore, we allow
the model’s Beta distribution to vary across jurisdictions by specifying ν as a
function of these ﬁve variables.
The coeﬃcient estimates in Table 2 imply that the average expected per-
centage of supporters across the 363 jurisdictions is 5.07/(5.07+4.14)=55% (see
Table 3). The estimates also indicate that increasing by ten percent the fraction
of baptists or the fraction of voting age population over the age of 50, decreases
supporters by approximately one percent. This suggests that both baptists and
people over 50 years old are ten percent more likely to oppose the referendum
than non-baptists and people under the age of 50, respectively.22 The num-
ber of prior year’s alcohol related accidents in the county increases the fraction
of supporters. This is consonant with Baughman, Conlin, Dickert-Conlin and
Pepper (2000) who ﬁnd that the number of alcohol related accidents in Texas
counties may actually decline with a less restrictive alcohol policy.23 In addi-
tion, the fraction of supporters is slightly less in cities and signiﬁcantly less in
jurisdictions located in an MSA. The large negative coeﬃcient associated with
the MSA variable implies that the fraction of supporters is eight percent less,
on average, if the jurisdiction is located in an MSA. The reason for this might
be that a jurisdiction that allows the sale of alcohol attracts more outsiders if
it is in an urban compared to a rural area. While some residents may perceive
this as a beneﬁt, others may be concerned about the type of people the alcohol
would attract. Alternatively, it may be that black market liquor is more readily
available in urban areas.
We allow supporters’ beneﬁt and opposers’ cost of a passed referendum to
depend on the type of referendum, whether the jurisdiction voting is a city and
whether passing the referendum would result in the jurisdiction having a more
liberal alcohol policy than any other jurisdiction in the county. The coeﬃcient
estimates indicate that all of these factors have large and statistically signiﬁ-
cant eﬀects. As for the type of referendum, Table 2 shows that the supporters’
beneﬁt and opposers’ costs are greater when the vote pertains to oﬀ-premise
consumption of all alcohol than when it involves beer and wine. The average
marginal eﬀects are to increase the supporter’s beneﬁt by 0.17 and the opposers’
22The fact that these variables are measured at the county-level and religious aﬃliations
are available at the county level only in 1970, 1980 and 1990, makes these noisy measures of
the fraction of baptists and the fraction of people over the age of 50 in the jurisdiction at the
time of the election. This may explain why their coeﬃcients are not statistically signiﬁcant.
23While these law changes decrease the implicit price of alcohol for the jurisdiction, they
also reduce the travel distance required to obtain the alcohol. Baughman, Conlin, Dickert-
Conlin and Pepper (2000) ﬁnd that for certain alcohol policy liberalizations, this second eﬀect
dominates in regards to alcohol related accidents.
17costs by 0.10. These are relatively large given the average beneﬁts and costs
to supporters and opposers (see Table 3). While the positive coeﬃcients as-
sociated with oﬀ-premise consumption were expected, the negative coeﬃcients
associated with oﬀ- and on-premise consumption of all alcohol were not.
The positive coeﬃcients associated with a referendum being voted on by a
city suggests that the beneﬁts and costs to voters of a less restrictive alcohol
policy are greater in city-level elections. A possible explanation is that residents
in more densely populated areas (such as cities compared to justice precincts)
are more likely to feel the impact of an alcohol policy liberalization. Referenda
involving a more liberal alcohol policy than exists in the rest of the county also
increases supporters’ beneﬁts and opposers’ costs. We expect these positive ef-
fects since if surrounding jurisdictions are tightly regulated, this should increase
the impact of a relaxation. As for the average marginal eﬀects of a city refer-
endum and a referendum involving the most liberal policy in the county, they
are 0.49 and 0.24 for the supporters’ beneﬁt and 0.66 and 0.40 for the opposers’
costs, respectively.
The coeﬃcients in Table 2 indicate that while the cost of voting does depend
on whether the election is held on the weekend, the weather conditions on the
day of the election and summer-time elections do not signiﬁcantly eﬀect the
cost of voting.24 T h ep o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient of 0.282 associated with the weekend
indicator variable implies an average marginal eﬀect of 0.65 on the upper support
of voting costs. We felt that voting on a weekend might be more costly because
individuals would have to give up their leisure time in order to vote. The
marginal eﬀect is signiﬁcant given that the average upper support of voting
costs across the 363 jurisdictions is 2.45 (see Table 3).
The average values of νj, wj, bj and xj presented in Table 3 indicate that
opposers feel much more intensely about the issue than do supporters. This
greater intensity translates into opposers having signiﬁcantly higher reasonable
cost levels on average than supporters. The average reasonable cost level is 0.76
for supporters and 0.96 for opposers. These yield average turnout rates of 31%
for supporters and 42% for opposers.
The predictions of the model’s exogenous variables and reasonable cost levels
imply a value of µj for each district. This can be combined with bj and xj to
provide a measure of the average net beneﬁt of the proposed change µjbj −(1−
µj)xj. The change passes a standard cost-beneﬁt test if and only if this average
net beneﬁt is positive. Of the 363 jurisdictions, 110 had a positive net beneﬁt.
While all of these 110 referenda did pass, 49 of the referenda with a negative
net beneﬁt also passed. This is a nice demonstration of the familiar idea that
majority voting does not produce surplus maximizing outcomes.
A proposed change with a positive net beneﬁt does not imply that holding
24Note that there is no constant term in the cost of voting function. By not including a
constant term we are setting the upper support of voting costs equal to one for elections held
on a non-summer weekday where there is no rain nor snow and the temperature is zero degrees
Fahrenheit. The normalization is required because we cannot infer beneﬁts and costs from
the number of people who vote for and against the referendum. Instead, we can only infer
relative beneﬁts and relative costs.
18a referendum is desirable because of the transactions costs associated with vot-
ing. Holding the referendum passes a cost-beneﬁtt e s ti fa n do n l yi fµj(bj −
(γ∗
sj)2/2cj) − (1 − µj)(xj +( γ∗
oj)2/2cj) is positive. Only 39 referenda had a
positive net beneﬁt when voting costs are included.25 This suggests that the
case for this form of direct democracy is weak when evaluated on conventional
cost-beneﬁt grounds.
The following section presents two alternative models by which to test the
appropriateness of the current model. Because the comparison of the three mod-
els will be primarily based on how well the models ﬁt the data, it is interesting
to note that the model just estimated explains 54 percent of the variation in
turnout for the referenda and 49 percent of the variation in turnout against the
referenda.
7 Alternative Models
The previous section showed how to estimate the parameters of our turnout
model assuming that it was the correct model. While the fact that the parameter
estimates seem reasonable is comforting, the results give us no reason to believe
that our basic model is a good approximation of voting behavior. To provide
evidence on this, we compare it with two simple alternatives. They are ad hoc,
in the sense that they do not provide an account of why people behave in the
postulated way, but they do capture basic ideas that have been expressed in the
turnout literature.
7.1 The intensity hypothesis
The intensity hypothesis asserts that people are more likely to vote the more
intensely they feel about an issue. This is consistent with an expressive view of
voting (see, for example, Brennan and Lomasky (1993)). Voting is like cheering
at a football game and you are more likely to cheer the more you care about
the outcome. Formally, we assume that supporters vote if their voting cost is
less than
γs = αb
and opposers vote if their voting cost is less than
γo = αx,
where α > 0. Here, the parameter α measures the strength of citizens’ desire to
express themselves through voting which may depend upon community charac-
teristics. The key restriction is that both supporters and opponents share the
same α. Under this speciﬁcation, the probability that a supporter votes is the
25The Texas state government’s recent move to require that liquor referenda be held on
uniform election dates should help in this respect by spreading the transactions costs over a
number of ballot issues. However, since it will also impact the likely turnout pattern, it may
also increase the set of referenda with negative net beneﬁts that pass.
19probability that γs exceeds his voting cost, which is γs/c = αb/c. Similarly, the
probability that an opposer votes is γo/c = αx/c.
To estimate the model, we assume as in the basic model that for each ju-
risdiction j, νj =1+e x p ( βv · zvj), ωj =1+e x p ( βω), xj =e x p ( βx · zxj + εj),
bj =e x p ( βb · zbj + εj) and cj =e x p ( βc · zcj). We further assume that αj =
exp(βα · zαj) where βα is a vector of parameters to be estimated and zαj is a
vector of jurisdiction speciﬁc characteristics that may aﬀect citizens’ desires to
express themselves. The parameters to be estimated are Ω = { βv,βω,βb, βx,
βα,βc}.
To construct the likelihood function, ﬁx Ω and consider a particular juris-
diction j. Then, according to the intensity hypothesis,









whereb bj =e x p ( βb·zbj) and b xj =e x p ( βx·zxj).L e t t i n gZj =( zvj,z bj,z xj,z αj,z cj),
the probability density function for (vsj,v oj) is then26
g(vsj,v oj;Ω,Z j)=
(b xj)νj(vsj)νj−1(b bj)ωj(voj)ωj−1











ςj =l ncj +l n ( b bjvoj + b xjvsj) − lnαj − ln b xj − lnb bj.
As in the basic model, we must ensure that the parameter estimates are such
that γsj and γoj are less than the upper support of the distribution of voting
costs. Therefore, we maximize the likelihood function subject to the constraints
that γsj ≤ cj and γoj ≤ cj for each jurisdiction j. These constraints impose








Table 4 shows the parameter values that maximize the likelihood function
subject to the above constraints and Table 5 contains average implied values of
the exogenous variables (νj,ωj,αj,b j,x j,c j) based on the parameter estimates.
We use the same variables to explain variation in ν, b, x,a n dc as in the basic
model. The coeﬃcients in Table 4 suggest that the eﬀects of these variables are
similar to those in the basic model. As indicated by the implied values in Table
5, the average expected percentage of supporters predicted by the intensity
model is almost identical to that in the basic model (54% compared to 55% ).
While it is impossible to directly compare the implied values of b, x and c across
26Again, the Appendix provides the derivation.
20models, note that while in both models the implied value of the opposers’ cost
is greater than the supporters’ beneﬁt, on average, this diﬀerence is much larger
in the basic model.
The strength of citizens’ desire to express themselves through voting is likely
to vary across jurisdictions depending on the jurisdiction’s religious composition,
age distribution, and size. The coeﬃcients in Table 4 associated with the fraction
of county population that is baptist, the fraction of county voting age population
over 50, and voting age population suggest that individuals who are baptist, over
the age of 50, and reside in smaller jurisdictions have a stronger desire to express
themselves through voting.
7.2 The popularity hypothesis
The popularity hypothesis asserts that people are more willing to vote if they ex-
pect that many of their fellow citizens share their position on the issue. The idea
is that the returns from voting are in the form of social approval (or avoidance
of disapproval) from those who share one’s position (as discussed, for example,
by Coleman (1990)). Accordingly, a supporter failing to vote for the referendum
when most other citizens are supporters, will experience more disapproval than
if most citizens are opponents.
Recalling that the mean value of µ is ν
ν+ω, we can capture this idea by










where α > 0. This says that individuals from each group are more likely to
vote the larger is the expected proportion of their group in the population. The
parameter α measures the value of obtaining approval in the election. This will
depend on community characteristics (such as size) and also on the salience of
the election to citizens. Again, the key restriction is that it is the same for
both supporters and opponents. Under this speciﬁcation, the probability that
a supporter votes is the probability that γs exceeds his voting cost, which is
γs/c = αν/c(ν + ω). Similarly, the probability that an opposer votes is γo/c =
αω/c(ν + ω).
T oe s t i m a t et h em o d e l ,w ea s s u m ea si nt h eb a s i cm o d e lt h a tf o re a c hj u r i s -
diction j, νj =1+e x p ( βv·zvj), ωj =1+e x p ( βω) and cj =e x p ( βc·zcj).W ea l s o
assume that αj =e x p ( βα · zαj + εj) where βα is a vector of parameters to be
estimated, zαj is a vector of jurisdiction and referendum speciﬁc characteristics
that may aﬀect the value of obtaining approval and εj is the realization of some
random variable distributed according to the standard normal distribution. The
vector of parameters to be estimated is therefore Ω = { βν, βω, βα,βc}.
21To construct the likelihood function, ﬁx Ω and consider a particular juris-
diction j. Then, according to the popularity hypothesis,















where b αj =e x p ( βα · zαj).L e t t i n gZj =( zαj,z vj,,z cj), the probability density














ςj =l n ( vjvoj + ωjvsj)+l n ( vj + ωj) − ln b αj +l ncj − lnvj − lnωj.
The constraints that γsj ≤ cj and γoj ≤ cj for each jurisdiction j impose the
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Tables 6 and 7 show the optimal parameter values and the implied average
values of the exogenous variables (νj,ωj,αj,c j).27 We use the same variables to
explain variation in ν and c as in the basic model. As indicated by the implied
values in Table 7, the average expected percentage of supporters predicted by
the popularity model is 49% which is less than the 55% predicted by the basic
model. Besides that associated with the city indicator variable, the coeﬃcients
in Table 7 suggest that the eﬀects of the variables on the fraction of supporters
are similar to those in the basic model. The positive and statistically signiﬁcant
coeﬃcient of 0.085 in the popularity model indicates that the fraction of sup-
porters increases by two percentage points if the election involves a city. As for
the cost of voting, the only coeﬃcient estimate in Table 6 that is appreciably
diﬀerent than the analogous estimate in Table 2 is the one associated with the
weekend indicator variable. While both models predict that having an election
on a weekend increases the cost of voting, the predicted eﬀect is larger for the
basic model. In addition, the popularity model predicts a much lower average
cost of voting than the basic model.
The social approval supporters and opposers obtain from voting is likely
to depend not only on the referendum but also the characteristics of the ju-
risdiction. We expect the social approval from voting to be greater the more
important the referendum and the more individuals interact with others who
have similar views regarding the liquor referendum. The coeﬃcients in Table 6
27The parameter estimates in Table 6 are such that none of the constraints bind.
22indicate that social approval increases when the referendum involves oﬀ-premise
consumption of alcohol, when the referendum involves a city, and when the sur-
rounding jurisdictions have more restrictive alcohol policies. While these eﬀects
a r ea se x p e c t e d ,t h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient associated with the oﬀ-a n do n - p r e m i s e
consumption is surprising. Interestly, the direction and magnitude of these ef-
fects on social approval are similar to those on supporters’ beneﬁta n do p p o s e r s ’
costs in the basic model. As for the size of the jurisdiction, the negative and sta-
tistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of -0.024 associated with voting age population
suggests that increasing a jurisdiction’s voting age population by 5,000 increases
the social approval from voting by, on average, 11.5 percent.
7.3 Comparing the models
To test the validity of the basic model relative to the intensity and popularity
models, we use the directional test for non-nested models proposed by Vuong
(1989). Vuong proposes a likelihood-ratio based statistic to test the null hypoth-
esis that two competing models are equally close to the true data generating
process against the alternative hypothesis that one model is closer. Vuong proves
that the diﬀerence between the maximum log-likelihood values of Model A and
Model B divided by the product of the standard deviation of the diﬀerence in
the log likelihood value for each observation and the square root of the number
of observations has a standard normal distribution if the two models are equiv-
alent. Vuong also demonstrates that the null hypothesis that Models A and B
are equivalent can be rejected when the alternative hypothesis is that Model A
(B) is better than Model B (A) if the above test statistic is greater (less) than
critical value c (-c) obtained from the standard normal distribution for some
signiﬁcance level.
The maximum log-likelihood values for the basic, intensity, and popularity
models are 749.20, 704.05, and 692.26 respectively. Table 8 presents the value
of Vuong’s test statistic for the three possible null hypotheses. These values
indicate the null hypothesis that the basic model is equivalent to the popularity
model and that the basic model is equivalent to the intensity model can be
rejected at the ﬁve percent signiﬁcance level when the alternative hypothesis is
that the basic model is better. However, these null hypotheses cannot be rejected
when the alternative hypotheses are that the popularity and intensity models
are better, respectively. Table 8 also indicates that the null hypothesis that
the popularity and intensity models are equivalent can be rejected at the ﬁve
percent signiﬁcance level when the alternative hypothesis is that the intensity
model is better. Thus, the basic model appears the best, with the intensity
model the runner up.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has made use of a unique data set to structurally estimate a model of
voter turnout and to statistically compare it with two simple alternatives. The
23results are encouraging: the structural estimation yields reasonable coeﬃcient
estimates and the model performs better than the alternatives. This suggests
that the approach to thinking about turnout that underlies the model warrants
serious consideration.
There are many diﬀerent directions for future research on this approach
(see also Feddersen and Sandroni (2001)). From an empirical perspective, it
would be worth comparing the performance of the model presented here with
that of the pivotal-voter model. While there are good reasons to be sceptical
about its abilities to explain turnout, the pivotal voter model represents in
many respects the simplest way of thinking about voting behavior. Thus, it
should only be rejected if it can be shown to be outperformed by some coherent
alternative. This has yet to be demonstrated. The data set used in this paper
is appropriate for studying the pivotal-voter model and the model we have
developed is a coherent alternative. It remains to structurally estimate the
pivotal-voter model and compare its performance. Given its great complexity,
this will be a challenging task.
From a theoretical perspective, it would be interesting to think about the
implications of heterogeneity in supporters’ and opposers’ preferences. It seems
likely that, within groups, those voters who care less intensely about an issue will
have lower reasonable cost levels. This may reﬂect considerations of equity in the
allocation of the costs of voting. Another interesting topic is how to think about
elections with three or more candidates. While such elections naturally divide
the population into groups of supporters, it is no longer obvious how supporters
of an underdog candidate should vote. This is particularly the case when there
are diﬀerences among group members in their second choice candidate. Finally,
more thought should be given to the justiﬁcation of the behavior postulated here.
Why should citizens believe that this is how they should behave in elections?
Moreover, even if they do believe it, what forces compel them to do their part?
24References
[1] Aldrich, John, [1993], “Rational Choice and Turnout,” American Journal
of Political Science, 37, 246-78.
[2] Aldrich, John, [1997], “When is it Rational to Vote,” in Mueller, Den-
nis (ed), Perspectives on Public Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
[3] Baughman, Reagan; Conlin, Michael; Dickert-Conlin, Stacy and John Pep-
per, [2000], “Slippery when Wet: The Eﬀects of Local Alcohol Access Laws
on Highway Safety,” Journal of Health Economics,f o r t h c o m i n g .
[4] Brennan, Geoﬀrey and Loren Lomasky, [1993], Democracy and Decision:
The Pure Theory of Electoral Preference, Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
[5] Coleman, James S., [1990], Foundations of Social Theory, Cambridge MA:
Harvard University Press.
[6] Downs, Anthony, [1957], An Economic Theory of Democracy,N e wY o r k :
Harper and Row.
[7] Feddersen, Timothy J. and Alvaro Sandroni, [2001], “A Theory of Partici-
pation in Elections,” mimeo, University of Rochester.
[8] Filer, John; Kenny, Lawrence and Rebecca Morton, [1993], “Redistribution,
Income and Voting,” American Journal of Political Science, 37, 63-87.
[9] Fiorina, Morris, [1997], “Voting Behavior,” in Mueller, Dennis (ed), Per-
spectives on Public Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
[10] Green, Donald and Ian Shapiro, [1994], Pathologies of Rational Choice
Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science,N e wH a v e n :Y a l e
University Press.
[11] Grossman, Gene and Elhanan Helpman, [2001], Special Interest Politics,
Cambridge MA: MIT Press.
[12] Hansen, Stephen; Palfrey, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal, [1987], “The
Downsian Model of Electoral Participation: Formal Theory and Empirical
Analysis of the Constituency Size Eﬀect,” Public Choice, 52, 15-33.
[13] Harsanyi, John C., [1980], “Rule Utilitarianism, Rights, Obligations and
the Theory of Rational Behavior,” Theory and Decision, 12, 115-33.
[14] Ledyard, John O., [1984], “The Pure Theory of Large Two-Candidate Elec-
tions,” Public Choice, 44, 7-41.
[15] Matsusaka, John and Filip Palda, [1993], “The Downsian Voter Meets the
Ecological Fallacy,” Public Choice, 77, 855-78.
25[16] Matsusaka, John and Filip Palda, [1999], “Voter Turnout: How Much Can
we Explain?” Public Choice, 77, 855-78.
[17] Morton, Rebecca B., [1987], “A Group Majority Voting Model of Public
Good Provision,” Social Choice and Welfare, 4, 117-31.
[18] Morton, Rebecca B., [1991], “Groups in Rational Turnout Models,” Amer-
ican Journal of Political Science, 35, 758-76.
[19] Palfrey, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal, [1985], “Voter Participation and
Strategic Uncertainty,” American Political Science Review, 79, 62-78.
[20] Riker, William H. and Peter Ordeshook, [1968], “A Theory of the Calculus
of Voting,” American Political Science Review, 62, 25-42.
[21] Shachar, Ron and Barry Nalebuﬀ, [1999], “Follow the Leader: Theory and
Evidence on Political Participation,” American Economic Review, 89, 525-
47.
[22] Uhlaner, Carole J., [1989], “Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of
Groups,” American Journal of Political Science, 33, 390-422.
[23] Vuong, Quang H., [1989], “Likelihood Ratio Tests for Model Selection and
Non-nested Hypotheses,” Econometrica, 57, 307-333.
269A p p e n d i x
9.1 Information on the data
A total of 526 local liquor elections are identiﬁed in the annual reports of the
Texas Alcoholic Beverage Commission between 1976 and 1996. We use 363 of
these in our estimation. Of the 163 elections we do not use, 64 were missing
critical information28 and 43 involved elections where other items seem likely
to have been voted on at the same time.29 To keep the basic issue constant
across elections, we focus on proposals to move from a completely “dry” status
where the selling of any alcohol is prohibited at the retail level.30 Therefore,
we eliminate the 53 elections where the jurisdiction was not “dry” prior to the
election. Finally, in order to structurally estimate our model, we drop three
elections where zero votes were cast against the referendum.31
The United States Census Bureau provides annual county-level populations,
by age. This information allows us to determine the population and the fraction
of the population over 50 at the time of the election when the jurisdiction
voting is either an entire county or a justice precinct. The population of a
justice precinct at the time of an election is estimated by dividing the county
population by the number of justice precincts in the county. We expect this to
be a relatively good approximation based on information provided by the Texas
Legislative Council indicating that justice precincts are selected so that each
in a particular county has roughly the same number of residents. The fraction
of the justice precinct over the age of 50 is assumed to be the same as in the
county.
In addition to the county-level information, the Census provides the total
population of many cities and towns in 1970, 1980 and 1990. For cities and
towns, the voting age population is estimated at the time of an election by
linearly interpolating and extrapolating the information provided by the Census
Bureau. Consider the city of Novice in Coleman county which had an election
on January 6, 1987. Novice had a voting age population of 129 in 1980 and 140
28Speciﬁcally, 12 observations did not identify the precise nature of the changes proposed by
the referendum, 15 elections occurred in cities not identiﬁed in the United States Census and
37 occurred in justice precincts where the precise number of justice precincts in the county
could not be identiﬁed with conﬁdence.
29We sent letters to the clerks of the 180 counties which had liquor elections over the period
requesting information on whether other issues were being voted on at the same time. Almost
half sent copies of the notes from the Commissioners Court’s meeting or a copy of the oﬃcial
document containing the results of the election. Both of these identiﬁed all items that were
voted on at the same time as the local liquor referendum. Most of the other county clerks sent
letters indicating whether the liquor law referendum was the only item on the ballot. A few
county clerks either did not respond or could not determine all items on the ballot. Of the 43
elections we suspect might have been held with other issues, 24 were ones for which we could
not get a response from the relevant county clerk and which were held on uniform election
days. The remaining 19, were ones that we knew for certain were held with other issues. Of
these, 16 were held on uniform election dates.
30A jurisdiction can prohibit the retail sale of all alcohol while still allowing private clubs
(including the VFW, American Legion and other fraternal organizations) to serve alcohol.
31All of these elections had at least one vote for the referendum.
27in 1990. By linearly interpolating this information, we estimate Novice’s voting
age population to be 136.7 at the time of the election. If the election occurred in
1993, we would estimate the population by using Novice’s voting age population
in 1990 and assuming that this population grew at the same rate as the county’s
voting age population between 1990 and 1993. Because Coleman’s voting age
population grew -1.56 percent from 1990 to 1993, we would estimate the voting
age population in Novice in 1993 to be 137.8. A similar extrapolation is used for
elections prior to 1980 in cities and towns whose populations were not reported
by the 1970 Census (but were in 1980 and 1990). As with the justice precincts,
the fraction of a city’s or town’s population over the age of 50 is assumed to be
t h es a m ea si nt h ec o u n t y .
Churches & Church Membership in the United States provides county-level
information on the number of adherents to Baptist denominations. It is pub-
lished every ten years (in 1970, 1980, and 1990). The total number of Baptists
in a county at the time of an election is estimated by linearly interpolating and
extrapolating this information. By dividing this number by the county popu-
lation, we obtain an estimate of the fraction of the county population that is
B a p t i s t .W eu s et h i sf r a c t i o na sap r o x yf o rt h ef r a c t i o no fB a p t i s t si ne a c ho f
the 363 jurisdictions; thereby, implicitly assuming that Baptists are uniformly
distributed throughout each county.
The United States Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC)
collects daily observations of maximum temperature, minimum temperature,
precipitation and snowfall from 1,062 weather stations (of which 44 are located
in Texas) comprising the United States Historical Climatology Network. We
calculate the midpoint of the maximum and minimum temperature at each
weather station on the day of an election and use this measure of temperature
in our speciﬁcation.
9.2 Proofs
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :Let (γ∗
s,γ∗
o) be an interior equilibrium. Then, (γ∗
s,γ∗
o)
























































































































































and substituting this into the above formulas yields the characterization stated
in the proposition. QED
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 :We need to show that γ∗





2c subject to the constraint that γs ∈ [0,c] and that γ∗
o




2c subject to the constraint
that γo ∈ [0,c]. We prove only the former claim, since the argument for the
latter is analogous.
If γ∗
s did not maximize the supporters’ payoﬀ,t h e r em u s te x i s ts o m eb γs that
would yield a higher payoﬀ. By condition (iii) of the Proposition, we know that







Note ﬁrst the following important claim.
Claim: Suppose that ϕ0(e γs)=0for some e γs ∈ (0,c]. Then, ϕ00(e γs) has the
opposite sign from (ν +2 ) e γs − (ω − 2)γ∗
o.
























































[(ν − 1)γs − (ω − 1)γo],
so we may write
hµ =
[(ν − 1)γs − (ω − 1)γo](γo + γs)h
γoγs
.












(e γs + γ∗
o)2{
[(ν − 1)e γs − (ω − 1)γ∗
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o > 0, the sign of ϕ00(e γs) is the opposite of the sign of
[(ν − 1)e γs − (ω − 1)γ∗
o]










This is positive if (ν +2 ) e γs > (ω − 2)γ∗
o and negative if (ν +2 ) e γs < (ω − 2)γ∗
o.
The Claim now follows. QED
Suppose ﬁrst that b γs > γ∗
s. Consider the problem
min{ϕ(γs):γs ∈ [γ∗
s,b γs]}
Since ϕ is continuous and the constraint set is compact, the problem has a
solution which we denote by e γs. Note that the solution must lie in the interior
of [γ∗
s,b γs]. To see this note that e γs must be less than b γs since ϕ(b γs) > ϕ(γ∗
s).
In addition, we know that by condition (i) ϕ0(γ∗
s)=0 , and by condition (ii)
30and the Claim, ϕ00(γ∗
s) < 0. This means that for γs slightly larger than γ∗
s that
ϕ(γs) < ϕ(γ∗
s).S i n c eϕ is smooth, it follows that ϕ0(e γs)=0and ϕ00(e γs) ≥ 0.
B yt h eC l a i m ,w eh a v et h a tϕ00(e γs) ≥ 0 if and only if (ν +2 ) e γs ≤ (ω − 2)γ∗
o.
But we know from condition (ii) and the fact that b γs > γ∗
s that (ν +2 ) e γs >
(ν +2)γ∗
s > (ω−2)γ∗
o so this is impossible. Thus, b γs cannot be greater than γ∗
s.
Now suppose that b γs < γ∗
s. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
b γs solves the problem:
max{ϕ(γs):γs ∈ [0,γ∗
s]}.
Since b γs ∈ (0,γ∗
s), we know that ϕ0(b γs)=0and ϕ00(b γs) ≤ 0.B yt h eC l a i m ,w e
know that (ν +2 ) b γs ≥ (ω − 2)γ∗
o. Now consider the problem
min{ϕ(γs):γs ∈ [b γs,γ∗
s]}
T h ep r o b l e mh a sas o l u t i o nw h i c hw ed e n o t eb ye γs. Note that the solution
must lie in the interior of [b γs,γ∗
s]. To see this note that e γs must be greater
than b γs since ϕ(b γs) > ϕ(γ∗
s). In addition, we know that by conditions (i)
and (ii) and the Claim, ϕ0(γ∗
s)=0and ϕ00(γ∗
s) < 0. This implies that for γs
slightly smaller than γ∗
s that ϕ(γs) < ϕ(γ∗
s).S i n c eϕ is smooth, it follows that
ϕ0(e γs)=0and ϕ00(e γs) ≥ 0. By the Claim, we have that ϕ00(e γs) ≥ 0 if and only
if (ν+2)e γs ≤ (ω−2)γ∗
o.B u tw ek n o wt h a t(ν+2)e γs > (ν+2)b γs > (ω−2)γ∗
o so
this is impossible. Thus, b γs cannot be smaller than γ∗
s.Q E D
9.3 Deriving the probability density function for (vsj,v oj)
9.3.1 The basic model















In addition, we know that µj and εj are continuous random variables having















31We know that vsj = usj(µj,εj) and voj = uoj(µj,εj) deﬁne a one-to-one
mapping from (µj,εj) space to (vsj,v oj) space. Thus, the joint probability
density function of (vsj,v oj) is given by:
gj(vsj,v oj)=hj(µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj))|Ψ|
where (µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj)) are deﬁned implicitly by the relations vsj =
usj(µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj)) and voj = uoj(µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj)) and
|Ψ| =

































εj(vsj,v oj)=2l n ( voj
q
b bj + vsj
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b xj)+l nB(νj,ωj)+l ncj
+2ln(voj
q
b bj + vsj
p
b xj) − (νj +2 )l n (
p
b xj) − (ωj +2 )l n (
q
b bj).
9.3.2 The intensity hypothesis













In addition, we know that µj and εj are continuous random variables having













By the same logic as for the basic model, the joint probability density func-
tion of (vsj,v oj) is given by:
gj(vsj,v oj)=hj(µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj))|Ψ|
where (µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj)) are deﬁned implicitly by the relations vsj =












Solving for µj(vsj,v oj) and εj(vsj,v oj), we obtain:
µj(vsj,v oj)=
b xjvsj
b bjvoj + b xjvsj
,
and











































ςj =l ncj +l n ( b bjvoj + b xjvsj) − lnαj − ln b xj − lnb bj.
349.3.3 The popularity hypothesis















In addition, we know that µj and εj are continuous random variables having













By the same logic as for the basic model, the joint probability density func-
tion of (vsj,v oj) is given by:
gj(vsj,v oj)=hj(µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj))|Ψ|
where (µj(vsj,v oj),εj(vsj,v oj)) are deﬁned implicitly by the relations vsj =





























































ςj =l n ( νjvoj + ωjvsj)+l ncj +l n ( νj + ωj) − lnωj − ln b αj − lnνj.
9.4 Solving the constrained maximization
For the basic model, the problem is to maximize (1) subject to the constraint
(2) holding for each jurisdiction j. Observe that the constraints described in
(2) have a nice linear structure. Moreover, we use the same four district speciﬁc
variables to explain variation in b and x and they are all dummy variables. Thus,
zbj = zxj =( 1 ,δ1j,δ2j,δ3j,δ4j) where δij ∈ {0,1} for i =1 ,2,3,4. Since there
are only sixteen possible values for the vector (δ1j,δ2j,δ3j,δ4j), we can divide
the districts into sixteen diﬀerent categories according to their (δ1j,δ2j,δ3j,δ4j)
vectors. We then need only impose the constraint for the two outliers in terms
of ln(
vsj
1−voj )2 and ln(
1−vsj
voj )2 values in each group. This reduces the number of
feasibility constraints to thirty two.
We use the following iterative procedure to solve the problem. First, we
group the districts into the sixteen categories t ∈ {1,...,16} according to the
values of their (δ1j,δ2j,δ3j,δ4j) vectors. We then select from each category
the district for which ln(
vsj
1−voj )2 is maximized, denoted j(t).N e x t , f o r e a c h
t, we maximize the likelihood function imposing only the single constraint that
ln(
vsj
1−voj )2 = βb·zbj−βx·zxj for district j(t).W et h e nl e tT(1) denote the set of
all t for which the solution satisﬁes the constraints that for all t0, ln(
vsj(t0)
1−voj(t0))2 ≤
βb·zbj(t0)−βx·zxj(t0) and let t(1) be the t ∈ T(1) which yields the highest value
of the likelihood function.
The second step in the iteration involves considering all possible pairs (t,t0)
such that t,t0 / ∈ T(1) and for each of these maximize the likelihood function
imposing only the constraints that ln(
vsj
1−voj)2 = βb · zbj − βx · zxj for districts
j(t) and j(t0).W et h e nl e tT(2) denote the set of all such (t,t0) pairs for which
the solution satisﬁes all the constraints and let (t,t0)(2) be the (t,t0) pair in
T(2) yielding the highest value of the likelihood function.
The third step is to consider all possible triples (t,t0,t 00) such that t,t0,t 00 / ∈
T(1) and (t,t0),(t,t00),(t0,t 00) / ∈ T(2) and for each of these maximize the likeli-
hood function imposing only the constraints that ln(
vsj
1−voj)2 = βb·zbj−βx·zxj for
36districts j(t),j(t0) and j(t00).W et h e nl e tT(3) denote the set of all such (t,t0,t 00)
triples for which the solution satisﬁes all the constraints and let (t,t0,t 00)(3) be
the (t,t0,t 00) triple in T(3) which yields the highest value of the likelihood func-
tion.
We continue doing this until the mth step in which it is not possible to
ﬁnd any admissible m-tuples. We then compare the value of the likelihood
function associated with t(1), (t,t0)(2), (t,t0,t 00)(3), etc. and pick the con-
straint combination that results in the highest value. This solves the prob-
lem of maximizing the likelihood function subject to the feasibility constraints
ln(
vsj
1−voj )2 ≤ βb · zbj − βx · zxj for all districts j. It also turns out to satisfy the
constraints that βb·zbj −βx·zxj ≤ ln(
1−vsj
voj )2 for all j and hence is the solution
to the full problem.
A similar iterative procedure is use for the intensity model. This procedure
was not required for the popularity model because the coeﬃcient estimates of
the unconstrained maximization problem satisﬁed all constraints.
37TABLE 1: Summary Statistics for the 363 Elections 
 
Fraction of Referenda involving only Beer/Wine 
 
0.40 (147 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Referenda involving Off-Premise Consumption 
 
0.40 (144 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Referenda involving Off- and On-Premise Consumption 
 
0.20 (72 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Referenda involving an Entire County 
 
0.01 (2 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Referenda involving a Justice Precinct 
 
0.37 (133 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Referenda involving an Incorporated Town or City 
 
0.63 (228 Elections) 
 
Voting Age Population in Jurisdiction 
 
Mean = 4145 
Standard Deviation=7464 
 








Fraction of Referenda involving more Liberal Policy than County 
 
0.33 (121 Elections) 
 
Number of Alcohol Related Accidents in County Divided by 
County Population (1,000) in past 12 months 
 
Mean = 2.04 
Standard Deviation=0.71 
 
Fraction of Jurisdiction Located in an MSA  
 
0.44 (158 Elections) 
 
Average Temperature on Day of Election (Fahrenheit) 
 
Mean = 65.2 
Standard Deviation=16.0 
 
Rainfall on Day of Election (tenths of inches) 
 
Mean = 0.96 
Standard Deviation=3.10 
 
Snowfall on Day of Election (tenths of inches) 
 
Mean = 0.06 
Standard Deviation=1.05 
 
Fraction of Referenda that occurred on Saturday or Sunday 
 
0.70 (255 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Referenda that occurred in Summer 
 
0.27 (97 jurisdictions) 
 
Fraction of Referenda that Pass 
 
0.41 (150 Elections) 
 
Fraction of Voting Age Population Voting For Referendum 
 
Mean = 0.17 
Standard Deviation=0.12 
 
Fraction of Voting Age Population Voting Against Referendum 
 
Mean = 0.19 
Standard Deviation=0.13 
 
Turnout (# of votes/ Voting Age Population) 
 
Mean = 0.36 
Standard Deviation=0.22 
 
Closeness (Difference between Votes For and Against Divided by 
Total Votes Cast) 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 TABLE 2: BASIC MODEL 
N=363 , Log Likelihood=749.20 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
v:   
























w:   




b:   




















x:   




















c:   
























Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** Statistically significant at the .05 level. 
  
TABLE 3: ESTIMATED VALUES FROM BASIC MODEL 
 


























Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 TABLE 4: INTENSITY MODEL 
N=363 , Log Likelihood=704.05 
VARIABLES  Coefficients 
v:   
























w:   
     Constant  1.165** 
(0.103) 
α:   
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c:   
























Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** Statistically significant at the .05 level.TABLE 5: ESTIMATED VALUES FROM INTENSITY MODEL 































Standard errors are in parentheses. TABLE 6: POPULARITY MODEL  
N=363 , Log Likelihood=692.26 
VARIABLES Coefficients 
v:   
























w:   
     Constant  1.240** 
(0.091) 
α:   
























c:   
























Standard errors are in parentheses.  * Statistically significant at the .10 level; ** Statistically significant at the .05 level. TABLE 7: ESTIMATED VALUES FROM POPULARITY MODEL 
 





















Standard errors are in parentheses. TABLE 8: VUONG￿S NON-NESTED TEST STATISTIC 
 
    Vuong￿s Test Statistic 
 
 














Intensity Model = Popularity Model 
 
 
2.08 
 
 